Arab Spring in Bahrain; The Hidden Story of Saudi Intervention and Sectarian Divide

Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t – A Deep Dive into Toby Matthiesen’s Analysis In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings that swept across North Africa and the Middle East, toppling long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states presented a stark contrast.

arab spring in bahrain that wasn’t!

While protests erupted in countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, these movements were swiftly contained, often through a combination of repression, co-optation, and the strategic deployment of sectarian narratives.

Toby Matthiesen’s 2013 book, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the arab spring in bahrain That Wasn’t, published by Stanford University Press, offers a compelling firsthand account and analytical framework for understanding this phenomenon.

Drawing on his experiences as an eyewitness in Bahrain during the height of the protests, Matthiesen argues that the Gulf monarchies, particularly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, weaponized sectarian divisions—primarily between Sunni and Shia communities—to undermine demands for reform and maintain their authoritarian grip on power.

The book, part of the Stanford Briefs series, blends journalistic reporting with academic rigor, providing insights into how these regimes transformed potential revolutions into contained crises. Matthiesen, a British scholar specializing in Middle Eastern politics and sectarianism, has established himself as a leading voice on Gulf affairs.

He holds positions at prestigious institutions, including the University of Cambridge and previously at the University of Oxford. His research often focuses on Shia politics in the Arab world, as seen in his later works like The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (2015).

In Sectarian Gulf, Matthiesen leverages his on-the-ground observations from Bahrain in 2011, where he witnessed the Pearl Roundabout protests firsthand, to dissect the broader regional dynamics.

The book is not merely a chronicle of events but a critique of how sectarianism was deliberately amplified as a tool of governance, especially in response to the Arab Spring. This approach sets it apart from other analyses of the uprisings, which often overlook the Gulf’s unique blend of oil wealth, tribal alliances, and geopolitical rivalries.

The arab spring in bahrain and the Gulf: A Revolution Deferred arab spring in bahrain began as a wave of popular demands for dignity, justice, and democratic reforms, inspired by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia in December 2010. By early 2011, these protests had spread to the Gulf, where economic disparities, political exclusion, and corruption fueled discontent.

In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Shia communities mobilized against discrimination; in Kuwait, youth activists challenged parliamentary gridlock; and in Bahrain, a diverse coalition of protesters gathered at the iconic Pearl Roundabout, calling for constitutional monarchy and an end to the Al Khalifa family’s absolute rule.

However, as Matthiesen details, these uprisings were “arab spring in bahrain that wasn’t” because the GCC regimes employed a multifaceted counter-revolutionary strategy.

Financial incentives, such as salary hikes and subsidies funded by oil revenues, bought temporary loyalty. More crucially, the regimes framed the protests as existential threats orchestrated by external forces, particularly Iran, to exploit Sunni fears of Shia empowerment.

This sectarian framing allowed rulers to rally conservative Sunni bases while isolating Shia protesters as disloyal or foreign agents.

Matthiesen’s narrative covers petitions, street demonstrations, and the subsequent crackdowns across the six GCC states—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman—highlighting how each adapted these tactics to local contexts. The book’s structure reflects this regional scope.

Early chapters recount the initial sparks of protest, drawing on interviews with activists, opposition figures, and ordinary citizens. Matthiesen describes the optimism of the early days, where cross-sectarian alliances briefly flourished, only to be shattered by state repression. Later sections analyze the long-term implications, including heightened sectarian tensions that have persisted into the 2020s, influencing conflicts in Yemen and Syria.

arab spring in bahrain Central to Matthiesen’s thesis is the case of Bahrain, where arab spring in bahrain failure was most pronounced and emblematic. Protests erupted on February 14, 2011, initially uniting Shia and Sunni Bahrainis in calls for political reform, an elected government, and accountability for corruption.

arab spring in bahrain\ The Pearl Roundabout became a symbol of hope, akin to Egypt’s Tahrir Square, with tents, speeches, and communal solidarity. Yet, within weeks, the movement was crushed through a brutal crackdown involving Bahraini security forces and foreign intervention. Why did the Arab Spring fail in Bahrain? Matthiesen attributes this to a deliberate sectarian strategy by the Al Khalifa regime, amplified by Saudi support.

The ruling family, a Sunni minority governing a Shia-majority population (estimated at 60-70%), portrayed the protests as a Shia-led Iranian plot to overthrow the monarchy and establish a theocratic state.

This narrative justified the demolition of Shia mosques, the arrest of medical personnel treating protesters, and the revocation of citizenship for dissidents. Sectarianism was not organic but engineered: state media and loyalist groups spread rumors of Iranian infiltration, while naturalization policies favored Sunni immigrants from Pakistan, Jordan, and Syria to alter demographics and bolster security forces.

A pivotal moment was the March 2011 intervention by the Peninsula Shield Force, a GCC military alliance led by Saudi Arabia. Over 1,000 Saudi troops crossed the King Fahd Causeway into Bahrain, ostensibly to protect infrastructure but effectively to quash the uprising.

Matthiesen, who was in Bahrain at the time, provides vivid accounts of the violence: tanks rolling into Manama, the destruction of the Pearl Monument, and the imposition of martial law. This intervention not only ended the protests but also deepened sectarian divides, as Shia communities felt targeted while Sunnis were co-opted through patronage.

The author argues that Bahrain’s crackdown set a precedent for the region, demonstrating how sectarianism could be mobilized to prevent broader democratic contagion. Saudi Arabia’s role was crucial, driven by fears that a successful Bahraini uprising could inspire its own Shia minority in the Eastern Province.

Riyadh viewed Bahrain as a strategic buffer against Iranian influence in the Gulf, and the intervention reinforced the Sunni monarchies’ alliance against perceived Shia threats. Matthiesen notes that this event marked the beginning of a “new Middle East cold war” between Saudi Arabia, where sectarian proxies became tools in a broader geopolitical struggle.

Sectarianism as a Governance Tool: Beyond Bahrain Matthiesen extends his analysis to Saudi Arabia, where protests in the Eastern Province were similarly framed as sectarian sedition. The Saudi regime, under King Abdullah, responded with a mix of carrots and sticks: billions in welfare spending alongside arrests and media campaigns accusing protesters of Iranian loyalty.

The book details how Wahhabi clerics were enlisted to condemn Shia activism, further entrenching divisions. In Kuwait, tribal and sectarian dynamics complicated protests, leading to parliamentary dissolutions but no full-scale revolution. The author’s key insight is that sectarianism was not a pre-existing inevitability but a “securitization” strategy—turning social issues into security threats to justify authoritarianism.

This approach allowed regimes to deflect attention from universal grievances like unemployment and inequality onto identity politics. Matthiesen critiques Western powers, particularly the U.S. and U.K., for their muted response, prioritizing strategic alliances (e.g., Bahrain hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet) over human rights. Impact and Reception: A Timely Critique Since its publication, Sectarian Gulf has been praised for its timeliness and depth.

Reviews highlight its blend of personal narrative and scholarly analysis, making it accessible yet rigorous. Critics in outlets like Jadaliyya commend Matthiesen for exposing the counter-revolutionary tactics of GCC states, while others note its relevance to ongoing sectarian conflicts. The book has influenced discussions on Gulf politics, appearing in academic curricula and policy debates.

However, some argue it underemphasizes economic factors or internal regime divisions. Nonetheless, its core argument—that sectarianism was a deliberate counter-revolutionary tool—remains prescient, especially amid Yemen’s war and Syria’s fragmentation.

Conclusion: Lessons from the Gulf’s “Spring That Wasn’t” Toby Matthiesen’s Sectarian Gulf serves as a cautionary tale about the perils of identity politics in authoritarian contexts. By examining why the Arab Spring faltered in the Gulf, particularly in Bahrain where it “did not happen,” the book illuminates broader patterns of repression and division.

In an era of resurgent authoritarianism, Matthiesen’s work reminds us that true reform requires transcending sectarian barriers, a challenge the Gulf monarchies have yet to meet. As regional tensions persist, this analysis remains essential for understanding the unfinished business of the 2011 uprisings.

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